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accommodate and regulate through various policies and programmes. States are expected to base their policies in their respective national traditions, which differ markedly (Robbers 2005) but share an ethos of secularism. In this context, Islam is often portrayed as including non-secularized elements that pose a problem to preexisting societal practices (Casanova 2007) .
The role of the state is obviously the larger the more interventionist it is in its nature.
The Scandinavian or Nordic welfare states are known for their spirit of social engineering, where inclusion in the labour force has been their main target combined with an ethos of social class and gender equality. The general labour market orientation is combined with financial support and co-operation with civil society for the common good, and hence there is no clear boundary between the third sector of associations and the state apparatus. This is in marked contrast with the AngloAmerican and, especially, the US tradition, where the state has had a more restricted role and civil society more autonomy. While these differences should not be exaggerated-as the state nevertheless sets the rules of the game and directs nongovernmental actors through legal and other means as well as by the allocation of resources-they are of importance as mentalities of rule and regulation, and also visible in scholarly discussions as normative presumptions. Nevertheless, there is some recent scholarship that argues that during the last thirty years many states around the world have created new types of bonds with civil society organizations, including the UK and the USA, so that civil society's actual independence of state concerns can be questioned in many cases (Sinha 2005) .
The focus of this article is the incorporation of Muslim immigrants in the context of the changing Finnish welfare state. It takes as its main discussion partner Nancy Foner and Richard Alba's (2008) article, 'Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe:
Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?'. Foner and Alba's text is selected here because it summarizes well the results and spirit of many studies on the topic of immigration, 80 integration and Islam, and engages in transatlantic academic debate of the role of religion in immigrant social integration. Here I will argue, however, that Foner and Alba's position rests on problematic theoretical grounds that do not take enough into account the changes in welfare state structures since the 1980s and, hence, provides a partial view on the state-civil society-religion dynamics in the era of neoliberal globalization. Foner and Alba also tend to overemphasize the differences between Muslims and other immigrants. Consequently, this article starts with a presentation of Foner and Alba's analysis and proceeds to discuss changes in the Finnish welfare state.
After that, the focus turns to immigrant Muslims and examples of new forms of public engagement with Muslims, the state and civil society in Finland will be presented. The final section of the article engages in discussion of Islam as a public religion in postsecular Finland, with reference to José Casanova's (1994) and Jürgen Habermas' (2008) views on the nature of contemporary religion. Casanova and Habermas are selected because both are referred to extensively in current theoretical debates on religion and modernity. The article aims to explain 'why the views of immigrant religion are so different on the two sides of the Atlantic and how they correspond with on-the-ground social realities' (Foner & Alba 2008: 361) . The authors argue 'that the difference is anchored in whether or not religion as belief system, institution, and community can play a major role for immigrants and the second generation as a bridge to inclusion in the new society' (Foner & Alba 2008: 361) . The focus of the article is the USA, France, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, but they claim that 'much of what we say applies to Western European countries generally' (Foner & Alba 2008: 361 (Foner & Alba 2008: 364-5) . In short, 'religion helps to turn immigrants into Americans and gives them and their children a sense of belonging or membership in the United States' (Foner & Alba 2008: 365) . In this manner, Foner and Alba draw attention to the great significance played by religious organizations which represent virtually every immigrant religion.
Foner and Alba on Immigrant Religion in Western Europe and the United States
In Europe, where, following Foner and Alba, Islam is the predominant immigrant religion, the picture is different. Muslims are considered with suspicion, if not with outright hostility, and they are suspected of constituting a threat to 'the liberal values of European states' (Foner & Alba 2008: 369) . Muslims are overall portrayed as discriminated against and as facing prejudice, and their religio-cultural practices are met with mistrust. Again, according to Foner and Alba, public representations of Islam and Muslims are dominated by such topics as the oppression of women, speculations about the creation of parallel societies and Muslims living on social benefits. Islam is cast as a religion that generates conflicts of various kinds; for example, Muslims are said to be increasingly viewed as having 'oppositional identities' (Foner & Alba 2008: 373) and as being associated with radicalization and terrorism. We may conclude that Foner and Alba's representation of Muslims in Europe focuses on the negative and conflictual public visibility of Islam, and problems with public authorities and structural or overt discrimination against Muslims, but they do not address the role of religious institutions in social integration with reference to Europe in the same detailed way as they did with reference to the USA. Some Finnish social scientists have described the welfare state transition as a move from a 'planning economy' to a 'competition economy' (Alasuutari 2006) , the latter captured in notions such as 'competitiveness society' (Heiskala 2006) and 'project society' (Sulkunen 2006) . Risto Heiskala (2006: 37) Although they numbered fewer than one thousand individuals, the Tatars were able to institutionalize and gained formal acceptance as an Islamic organization in 1925 based on the then new Religious Freedom Act, which followed the independence of Finland in
December 1917. Tatar immigration ended in the mid 1920s due to the closing of the border with the Soviet Union (Martikainen 2009: 78-83) .
Muslim migration remained at low levels until the 1960s, but gradually increased due to work, study and marriage migration. As Finland was a post-war emigration country, Table 1 ). 92 communities, increasing levels of co-operation with public authorities can be identified.
Moreover, as the historical differences between the USA and Finnish welfare structures are distinctly different, the statement should be understood in that context. Hence, the service structure of the state affects activities on the community level that is related to the religion--state relations to which we shall turn next.
State-Muslim Relations
The Finnish state views itself as religiously neutral, even though the special historical (Finnish, rekisteröity yhdistys). The former includes a thorough evaluation process and such organizations may be granted specific rights, such as the ability to perform formally approved marriages and the right to have religious education in state schools. The latter is a less demanding process, where the association has the right to have its own finances. Currently, the legislation regarding these two organizational forms is similar. We also need to bear in mind that the formal religious registration process to be recognized as a Local authorities encouraged these groups to apply for formal recognition as 'religious community organizations' or 'registered associations'. The rationale was that by doing so the groups would be able to apply for municipal support, which was welcome as the majority of new Muslims were of refugee background with few resources of their own.
Most local Muslim groups were quick to organize, and hence they gradually became Casanova relates the emergence of public religion-or 'deprivatization'-to 'the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them' (Casanova 1994: 5) . In this vein, he refers to political developments (Casanova 1994: 3) . 98 outsourcing of former state services to the private sector and increasing partnerships with 'civil society'. 13 As noted by Anne Mette Kjaer, outsourcing involves a fundamental change in the way things are regulated. As the line of command changes from hierarchical rule by command to policy network steering by reciprocity and trust, the state's capacity to guide results is weakened, even though it still has power via the allocation of resources and the setting of rules (Kjaer 2004: 19, 43 To summarize the discussion so far, we can say that the social location of Islam in
Finland has transformed as follows (see Table 2 ). 100 an increasing marketization of religion, of which there are many signs already, as the previous institutional structures are transforming.
Conclusion
The While there is a relatively high degree of public interventions, they do only modestly make sense within the framework of historical state-church/religion relations. Rather, they were viewed as examples of the transforming governance of religions that is based on the emergence of a neoliberalized project society. These interventions erode the classical place of a minority religion in Finland, and invite the group in question to participate actively in the construction of social capital and social cohesion for the common good-an activity that the state has increasingly outsourced to civil society. 
